The Burden of the Past, the Dialectics of the Present: Notes on Virginia Woolf's and Walter Benjamin's Philosophies of History by Bahun, Sanja
The Burden of the Past, the Dialectics of the Present: Notes on 
Virginia Woolf’s and Walter Benjamin’s Philosophies of History 
 
 
 
Sanja Bahun 
 
 
 
Preface: On Reading and Writing 
 
Writing in a Paris rife with war-anxieties, refugees and political plots, a stateless individual by the 
name of Walter Benjamin recorded on 11 January 1940: “Every line that we succeed in publishing 
today – given the uncertainty of the future to which we consign it – is a victory wrested from the 
power of darkness.”1 The fusion of desperation and mystical activism in the face of historical 
horror, expressed in Benjamin’s last letter to Gershom Scholem, was echoed across the Channel. 
Only ten days later, Virginia Woolf – assailed by a mixture of historical, financial, creative and 
publishing worries – responded to a commission to write about peace by stating that the “views on 
peace […] spring from views on war.”2 For both Woolf and Benjamin, this anxiety of writing-
reading (in) history was a corollary of the shared belief that “thinking [was] [their] fighting,” as 
Woolf noted in her Diary, and that the contemporary socio-political situation necessitated an 
urgent reconfiguration of one’s understanding of history, indeed a change in the very telos of 
historical engagement.3 This volatile ‘thinking-fight’ became a common project for these two 
intellectuals who never met.  
To talk about virtual encounters and hypothesise the results of these exchanges as if they had 
really happened is always difficult. It is with an amount of apprehension but also conviction that 
such exercises in possible histories are productive that I embark on the project of establishing the 
coordinates of Benjamin and Woolf’s unrealised dialogue. Aimed at the activation of their thought 
in association, my enquiry will take the form of a close comparison between Benjamin’s and 
Woolf’s last written thoughts on the subject of history – Benjamin’s essay ‘On the Concept of 
History’ (“Über den Begriff der Geschichte”; this text is familiar to readers in Harry Zohn’s 
rendition as ‘”Theses on the Philosophy of History”) and Woolf’s novel Between the Acts.4 These 
texts share not only a moment of production, but also their authors’ hesitance to grant them 
“public life”: both texts were published only posthumously and in defiance of their authors’ 
explicit wishes.5 To the imagined and real concerns of their authors, the audience, however, 
responded enthusiastically.  
Benjamin’s and Woolf’s individual philosophies have captured scholarly attention for a long 
time, but the critical effort to address the intellectual correlations between these two authors has 
begun only recently.6 While the ‘Benjaminians’ seem to be generally uninterested in Woolf-related 
scholarship, Benjamin’s various conceptualizations of modernity have been recognised as a fertile 
theoretical support for Woolf studies. It is thus not surprising that the attempts to evaluate the 
theoretical constellations between the two authors have come mostly from Woolfian quartiers. 
The site of Benjamin’s thought most frequented in Woolf scholarship is the notion of the flâneur, a 
concept that has proved itself singularly amenable to the analysis of both Woolf’s own interest in 
the philosophy of flânerie and the historical subject constructed in the metropolitan meandering-
and-observing activities of her characters.7 Complementing these enquiries, the relationship 
between Benjamin’s theory of mass culture and technology and Woolf’s writing about, reflecting 
on, and participating in the culture of technology was addressed in one valuable collection of 
essays (Caughie 1999), and the correspondences between Benjamin’s and Woolf’s philosophies of 
language were treated in an inspired article by Makiko Minow-Pinkney.8
The commensurability of Benjamin’s and Woolf’s philosophies of history, however, has hardly 
been given proper critical attention. The rare exception is the introductory discussion in Marie-
Luise Gättens’s Women Writers and Fascism: Reconstructing History (1995).9 Comparing 
Benjamin’s thought on history to Woolf’s cogitation on the gendered aspects of fascism in Three 
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Guineas (1938), Gättens perceptively observes that both thinkers link fascist ideology to 
progressivism and consequently develop structurally comparable challenges to the concept of 
linear history. Since hers is not a book on either Benjamin or Woolf (or modernist philosophies of 
history, for that matter), Gättens does not venture further; yet even the mere juxtaposition reveals 
the Benjamin-Woolf convergence as replete with critical potential. Benjamin’s and Woolf’s 
comparable discussions of fascism as both a paradigmatic articulation and a consequence of the 
linear conception of history are indeed a product of the shared impetus to provide an ethically and 
existentially grounded critique of the Enlightenment. Yet, one may wish to underscore that this 
impetus itself is a result of correspondent experiences of history, a shared condition which 
Benjamin termed “the split structure of experience”: an intrinsically anti-linear, if differently 
gendered and linguistically and culturally rooted, understanding of life and history.10 I would like 
to accentuate the shared structural basis of Benjamin’s and Woolf’s experiences of history here. In 
characteristic Benjaminian-Woolfian fashion, this historical experience has more to do with the 
movement from the “real world” to the “inner experience” (and back) than with either the material 
world or human interiority independently. An understanding that a movement across the borders of 
the outer and the interior is a force driving Benjamin’s and Woolf’s accounts of history allows us 
to detect what is truly commensurable in Benjamin’s and Woolf’s thought – the reframing of two 
major psychological and epistemological practices, interlocked and, as it were, bound to this 
outward-inward movement: writing and reading. 
The recognition of the persistence of this outward-inward movement in Benjamin and Woolf 
may also help us understand another authorial trait which these two thinkers share: their 
continuous dissatisfaction with the proposed models of history, including those proposed by 
themselves. For neither Benjamin nor Woolf seem to stop at the critique of linear history; rather 
than unequivocally espousing alternative models, for example, circular history or fragmented 
(intermittent) history, Benjamin and Woolf continually probe the practices of reading and writing 
history, questioning, indeed, the viability of any fact-based conceptualisation. In turn, they 
constantly refine their own conceptualisation of history. What I suggest here is that, taken in sum, 
Benjamin and Woolf’s critiques of the traditional concept of history are at the same time more 
socially radical and more theoretically problematic than is usually perceived: they entail the 
questioning of consistency of facts as a judicious requirement for any conceptualisation. For all the 
danger of inefficacy (of which both Benjamin’s and Woolf’s respective philosophies of history 
have been accused), this questioning is highly relevant for everyday social practice. Thus I will 
open this study by a methodological caveat: to actualize the socio-political potential of Benjamin’s 
and Woolf’s thought on history, one has to accept history in their writings not as a metaphor or a 
critical trope but as a distinctive engagement with the material world, as a living dialectics that 
may offer tangible means of reflecting on and working in history: the transformation of the 
practices of acquiring and recording knowledge. The present article is premised on such an 
interpretation. 
 
 
Convergences 
 
That the potential link between Benjamin’s and Woolf’s philosophies of history has received scant 
critical attention is not surprising; the idea of comparative work exploring artists and philosophers 
of history still rings false. With respect to these two authors in particular, the empirical evidence 
confirming the possibility of mutual influence is still lacking, and interested scholars naturally feel 
uncomfortable with overly general correspondences. Yet it is reasonable to conclude that 
Benjamin might have at least heard about Woolf and her fiction by 1939-1940. One may take the 
following as the sensible indicators of Woolf’s growing reputation in France from 1927 to 1940: 
Jacques-Émile Blanche’s introductory article on Woolf in Les nouvelles littéraires (13 Aug 1927), 
accompanied by the French translation of Woolf’s short story “Kew Gardens” and the first 
passages of To the Lighthouse; the publication of Mrs. Dalloway in French in 1929 (with the 
preface written by André Maurois); the publication of Floris Delattre’s book-length study Le 
Roman psychologique de V. Woolf (1932); and Marguerite Yourcenar’s famous translation of The 
Waves in 1937.11 Finally, Woolf was also closely attached to the French cultural scene by both 
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personal proclivities and an extended circle of acquaintances which included female literati such as 
Sylvia Beach and Adrienne Monnier, both close friends and supporters of Benjamin.12 
Significantly, Beach and Monnier also provided Benjamin with English and American literature in 
the late 1930s, a period that saw an increase in the his interest in the English language and 
Anglophone creative writing (SW, 441).   
On the other hand, Woolf may have been acquainted with or, even more, engaged in the 
contemporary German philosophical and literary scene in a more direct way – via her associations 
with the young Bloomsbury generation, namely, W. H. Auden, Christopher Isherwood and 
Stephen Spender, and Beatrix and John Lehmann (the managing director of the Hogarth Press 
1938-46), all of whom intermittently participated in Berlin cultural life in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. The complex yet stimulating task of tracing the association between German and British 
inter-war philosophies of history has to revolve around the (potential) link between these young 
intellectuals and Bertolt Brecht, whose own political aesthetic was, in turn, much influenced by his 
collaboration and friendship with Benjamin from 1929 onwards. Auden’s presence at the first 
production of Bertolt Brecht’s and Kurt Weill’s The Threepenny Opera (in autumn 1928) seems to 
have been one of the formative experiences not only for the poet himself but for an entire 
generation, including those who participated in that vigour indirectly, as Woolf did.13 Auden’s first 
stay in Berlin and his timid participation in its intellectual life also coincided with the period in 
which Brecht’s and Benjamin’s friendship intensified and their tense intellectual collaboration 
started: it is in the context of their dynamic plans for a new critical journal dedicated to literature, 
philosophy, and political science that Benjamin’s early philosophy of history was forged.14 All 
these intellectual encounters matured and transformed in the 1930s into a complex network of 
mutually invigorating “artistic” philosophies of history, a constellation that still waits to be 
critically addressed. The present essay is dedicated to one such convergence: Benjamin’s and 
Woolf’s final thoughts on history. 
Benjamin’s essay “On the Concept of History”, completed in late April or early May 1940, 
comprises eighteen theses on the concept of history (perhaps followed by two sections headed by 
capital letters A and B).15 The theses are organized by the opposition of two models of 
historiography: one, referred to as “historicism”, which subsumes the flaws of all kinds of the then 
operative historiography and which finds a political counterpart in the German Social Democratic 
Party; the other, called “historical materialism”, which offers a set of alternatives to the normative 
models of archiving, selection, reference, and interpretation of historical data. The theses engage 
various, sometimes incompatible, intellectual and activist currents in philosophy of history, and 
propose a combustive fusion of theology and Marxism as a solution to the conundrums of 
history.16 The result is a twofold critique: a critical assessment of the traditional historiography as 
a practice based on empathy with historical victors, and the critique of the conceptualisation of 
history which is rooted in the notion of humankind’s unbound progress. While the essay could be 
understood as an end-product of almost twenty years of Benjamin’s reflection on the content and 
practice of history, Benjamin confided to a number of correspondents that the text had been 
specifically motivated by what he perceived to be the common experience of his generation in the 
years leading to the Second World War.17
Like Benjamin, Woolf admits that her last novel, Between the Acts, is marked by the general 
feeling of “the doom of sudden death hanging over.”18 Compressed within the course of twenty-
four hours of a June day in 1939, Between the Acts delineates its narrative space against the 
background of “the gun slayers, bomb droppers” at the beginning of the Second World War (BTA, 
187). Yet, within this moment of extended stasis, between the acts, several things happen and the 
narrative, analogically linked to history, moves simultaneously in circles and increments: a family 
undergoes a subtly intoned crisis and an ambitious village pageant is performed on the family 
grounds despite the vagaries of the summer weather; the pageant is a symbolist-ritualist-Brechtian 
exercise that aspires to present nothing less than English history in its entirety (as well as the 
history of English literature). As the day progresses, the agents of the private world and general 
history are revealed as comparable, and the family house emerges as a privileged synergic point 
for the performance of personal and socio-historical agons. This series of narrative moves unearths 
gaps in official, private, and literary histories, and effectively underscores the inadequacy of the 
operative models of recording history.   
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 What connects these two generically different cogitations on contemporary and general history 
and the practice of its record? Part of the answer lies in the exact contemporaneity of the two texts 
and, consequently, in the similarity of possible “real world incentives” which are easy to intuit. As 
becomes evident early in the texts, both Benjamin’s and Woolf’s specific target in their last 
writings is the ineffectiveness of the global response to the rise of fascism. Benjamin emphasizes 
that “the current amazement that the things we are experiencing are ‘still’ possible in the twentieth 
century is not philosophical” (“Concept”, 391), and he finds an exemplar of this ineffectual 
‘amazement’ in the behaviour of the German Social Democratic Party. Woolf, on the other hand, 
distributes the question of what would be an effective or ineffective response to the current history 
among many characters in Between the Acts; the issue of historical engagement torments not only 
Giles, but also every major and minor character, including the ghostly narrator herself.  
More generally, however, Benjamin’s vision of the past and the present united in the moment 
of danger speaks well to Woolf’s artistic and political project in Between the Acts – to write the 
world/human life in a moment of crisis. Yet this project is also characteristic of a general 
modernist philosophical-historical sentiment of the late 1930s, and it should be noted, that, to a 
certain extent, Benjamin’s and Woolf’s critiques of normative historiography can be viewed as the 
more or less typical intellectual fruits of their time. Their philosophies of history consist of a stock 
of modernist conceptual tropes: anti-progressivism, critique of Enlightenment, interaction of 
theory and practice (after Benedetto Croce), and, as Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner has noted with regard 
to Benjamin, the discourse of “a rather conservative critique of civilization which became 
amalgamated in the 1920s and the 1930s with the position of the ‘Left’.”19 Furthermore, both 
authors are mindful of the narrative character of the historical record, and, similarly to the early 
conceptualisations of the Annales School, attentive to (urban) geography, material culture, and 
group psychology; the last is particularly characteristic of Woolf’s mature writing. Like many 
contemporaneous philosophers of history (and the Cambridge friends of the Stevens), Benjamin 
and Woolf reject G. W. F. Hegel’s teleological model of history as the realization of the idea of 
freedom; thus their conception of history gives expression to the demise of progressive linear 
sequence, i.e., narrative, which was much in evidence in the thought and creative writing of the 
period. Similarly to many other modernist thinkers and creative writers, Benjamin and Woolf use 
myth as a structural lever for their critique of linearity. Furthermore, both thinkers have made 
precarious attempts to “deteleologize” some alternative ontologies (theology and pantheism, 
respectively). Finally, much of Virginia Woolf’s mature creative work and almost the entire 
oeuvre of Walter Benjamin may be understood in the context of cultural history, the then nascent 
discipline in which Benjamin was educated (which was much in prominence in the circle of the 
Cambridge Apostles) and within which and against which Benjamin and Woolf must have 
formulated their major insights.20 Yet to each of these lines of inquiry, Benjamin and Woolf 
offered their own methodological correctives, fusing and moulding concepts without worrying too 
much about hermeneutical inconsistencies, but taking an extraordinary interest in the form of their 
own cogitations. And this is the point which I would like to elucidate further. 
For, as will become apparent, one of the decisive factors in my choice to correlate these two 
writings has been the profound, if occluded, structural and discursive similarity of Benjamin’s and 
Woolf’s texts. This commensurability across textual forms (the genre of ‘theses’ and the genre of 
the novel, respectively) exteriorises a number of similarities in the authors’ perception, evaluation, 
and rendition of history. The structural correspondence of Benjamin’s and Woolf’s last writings is 
thus the function of the shared subject-matter: how to write history. Or, more precisely: how 
writing about or narrating history can be liberated from the entanglement in the discursive 
dominance of victors, rulers, and their heirs (“Concept”, 391). What these “swan’s songs” of two 
exemplary modernists propose by their content-made-form is a questioning or dereifying of 
reading-writing practice. Such a dereifying practice should be recognized as one of the most 
significant modi of ‘working in history’, indeed the only possible way to generate transformation 
in history, Benjamin’s and Woolf’s writings propose. In the following pages, I will examine the 
major properties of this practice. 
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The Way of History: Lines, Circles, and Other Forms of Record 
 
Speaking from a great historical watershed, both Benjamin and Woolf define the practice of 
writing and working in history as inextricably bound to the question of how one perceives the 
relation between the past, the present, and the future. For both thinkers, the greatest danger for our 
understanding of history resides in the customary espousal of linearity, a form of temporal 
hegemony to which we are prone and by which we unwittingly become a tool of the dominant. Let 
us, then, first spell out what it means to become an instrument in this game: it is to subscribe to a 
notion of universal history unfolding progressively in homogenous and empty time, which 
produces what we retrospectively “recognize” as a layering of cultural and historical products: 
“Babylon, Nineveh, Clytemnestra, Agamemnon, Troy” (BTA, 140) – Woolf is poignantly selective 
in her choice of historical “wreckages” which an honest historian cannot contemplate without 
horror (SW, <Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”>, 406-407). Benjamin argues that the 
self-perpetuating association of the notions of universal history, progress, and culture, presents the 
most detrimental aspect of our reflection on, experience of, and work in history. Woolf follows 
Benjamin closely in two of these critiques, that of the notion of progress and that of universal 
history unfolding in homogenous time (she has a different and more complicated take on culture, 
though). Drawing our attention to the use of similar figures of speech, Marie-Luise Gättens has 
emphasized that Woolf’s “procession of the sons of educated men” in Three Guineas and 
Benjamin’s “the triumphal procession” in ‘On the Concept of History’ both point to “the 
connection between progress, a notion of history as unfolding in linear time, and the violence that 
accompanies it” (Gättens, 32). But we can find the subversion of linearity and progressivism more 
vividly represented in the fragmentation and dissipation of all the ‘processions’ in Woolf’s 
Between the Acts, from the line of villagers passing in and out of the stage during Miss La Trobe’s 
pageant, to the scattered spectators, to the dramatic form which is given to Miss La Trobe’s 
pageant and the novel itself. As it appears in Benjamin’s and Woolf’s writings, then, the threefold 
critique of linear progression – the critique which is both expositional and formal – presents a 
sophisticated corrective not only to traditional philosophies of history, but also to those by Hegel 
and Marx.  
It is instructive, however, to take a closer look at this critique. At first sight, it might seem that 
Benjamin and Woolf counter Enlightenment progressivism by the familiar modernist 
experimentation with cyclicity. Their critique does partake of the same rebellion, but it differs 
from the simple negation of linear unfolding of history by superimposition of a mythical cycle. As 
frequently noticed by Woolf scholars, the writer’s seemingly ‘cyclical constructions’ are never 
self-identical;21 likewise, Benjamin criticizes the eternity of a cycle on a few occasions, most 
explicitly in his <Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”>. Indeed, one may argue that 
Woolf and Benjamin are not so much against linearity as they are against the exultation of 
‘homogeneity’ of history and of vulgar progressivism which find its expression in linear narration. 
On some occasions, it also appears that neither of the two thinkers is against the notion of 
universal history per se, but only against its positioning in homogenous time-and-space without a 
constructive (or aesthetic) principle to move it, disrupt it, explode it. This contradictory critical 
potential comes from the fundamental hermeneutic instability of both Benjamin’s and Woolf’s 
philosophy of history: their reflections vacillate between the different proposed and rejected 
models of history (spiral, linear, cyclical history, history of events, intermittent history, and so on), 
and, at times, adopt a genuine espousal of one, none or some of these models. The unifying factor 
in these volatile conceptualisations of history is the belief that “‘the state of emergency’ in which 
we live is not the exception but the rule” (“Concept”, 392) and that this condition demands a 
constant reconfiguration of our perception of and practice in history.  
As I have mentioned, it is primarily in the relation of the three aspects of time as shot through 
by the socio-political moment of “the now of recognizability” (SW, “Paralipomena”, 405) that 
Benjamin’s and Woolf’s philosophies of history are commensurate. The shared concern is the 
product of a more general tendency in the philosophy of history and historiography of the time, 
one that aptly conjoins German and Anglophone intellectual spaces: presentism. Articulated by 
thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, R. G. Collingwood, and Michael Oakeshott, and much 
discussed in Cambridge at the turn of the century, presentism dispels the notion that one can 
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address the past independently of the present. On the contrary: it is only through/from the present 
that we understand the past, and, as such, the past has to interrelate with the present. For both 
Benjamin and Woolf, this insight is vital, for it allows them to think of the relation between 
different time planes in non-linear terms.22 Yet neither Benjamin nor Woolf accepts this doctrine 
uncritically. In fact, in Theses VI-VII Benjamin explicitly denounces the basic premise of 
presentism: the belief that it is possible to record history “the way it really was” (Leopold von 
Ranke) by empathizing with the past events (in the tracks of Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher). The “fake innocence” of this position is belied by the fact that the historian’s 
“empathy” (Einfühlung) is always empathy with the side victorious in historical dynamics 
(‘Concept’, 391). Benjamin is vocal in his admonition that the attempt to “relive” an era is 
necessarily conducted with the help of artefacts, preserved “cultural treasures”, which are 
invariably the choice of socio-political and cultural victors (“Concept”, 391). For Woolf (or 
Woolf-as-philosopher-of-history) however, this wariness of empathy is new; it may very well be 
that Between the Acts is the only novel where this suspicion is discursively and performatively 
articulated. Unlike Sabine Hotho-Jones, who grounds Woolf’s thought on history firmly in the 
doctrine and practice of presentism, I would argue that Woolf – at least the Woolf of Between the 
Acts – was deeply aware of the hegemony of the history-writing subject inherent in this doctrine. It 
is with much ironic distance and marked, indeed Brechtian, alienation effects that we observe the 
unfolding of British history in Miss La Trobe’s play. Replete with gaps, diverse rhythms, and short 
cuts, this history is, importantly, presented by an unlikely set of actors – an idiot, a tobacco-seller, 
a young shop assistant, a cowman, and others – whose mundane life compellingly and humorously 
deconstructs the history presented on the stage. Evidently, Woolf shares Benjamin’s belief that to 
write or perform history truthfully does not mean to recognize and record the past events as they 
“really” happened, to “resurrect”, “relive” them, or even to narrate them in traditional terms. 
Rather, she might agree with the German thinker that the effort narratively to re-member history 
entails getting involved with a pile of wreckages. 
 
 
(Im)possible Histories  
 
Benjamin’s and Woolf’s shared denouncement of traditional historiography is, therefore, premised 
upon two critical propositions. First, the validity of the inherited historical record is dubious: there 
are more and more varied histories than we have accounted for. Secondly, the attempt to represent 
the past events as they ‘really happened’ as well as the process of empathy by which traditional 
historiography lays its claims to truth are essentially hegemonic practices. These two critiques of 
traditional history-writing can be translated into two fundamental questions pertaining to “new 
writing of history”: Who/what should be the subject of historical knowledge? How should that 
knowledge be rendered?  
For Benjamin, the new historiographer should “brush history against the grain” and salvage the 
object of historical inquiry from the realm of the obscured and the vanquished (“Concept”, 392). 
But this realm of the obscured, rendered through the broadly conceived category of “the 
anonymous” (<Paralipomena>, 406), is wider than one might expect at first. In his commentary on 
Thesis VII, Adorno underscores the importance of the activity of “brushing against the grain”, but 
he also points out a specific intervention in epistemology and methodology of historical research 
that such a move implies: 
  
If Benjamin said that history had hitherto been written from the standpoint of the victor, 
and needed to be written from that of the vanquished, we might add that knowledge must 
indeed present the fatally rectilinear succession of victory and defeat, but should also 
address itself to those things which were not embraced by this dynamic, which fell by the 
wayside – what might be called the waste products and blind spots that have escaped the 
dialectic. It is in the nature of the defeated to appear, in their impotence, irrelevant, 
eccentric, derisory (. . .) Theory must deal with cross-grained, opaque, unassimilated 
material . . . 23
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Benjamin’s writings speak well to Adorno’s advice: their regular subject is the fleeting 
contents of history’s underside: Germany’s unemployed; the protestant lamentation play in the 
context of the exuberance of the catholic Baroque; bohemians and flâneurs of the Second Empire; 
children; the avant-gardists of the 1930s; temporally displaced story-tellers; the mentally ill; 
gamblers; old toys; city-streets; pornography; “absent presences” such as shadows and angels; and, 
also, as Beatrice Hanssen has recently suggested, a variety of natural world occurrences – wild and 
domestic animals, stones, and dual-species creatures such as those found in Franz Kafka’s 
writings.24 This (seemingly) impotent, eccentric and ex-centric material presents the subject-core 
of Benjamin’s enquiries; it constitutes a dynamic philosophy of history dedicated to what 
Rodolphe Gasché has called a “radical and non-phenomenal Other.”25
Virginia Woolf agrees with Benjamin that it is “the struggling, oppressed class itself” or “the 
anonymous” that should be the subject of historical interrogation (“Concept”, 394). Indeed, 
already in 1925 Woolf sketched the project of revealing the unrecognized or unassimilated 
material of history. In her Diary, Woolf records that she would like to devote her writing efforts to 
the depiction of the “Lives of the Obscure – which is to tell the whole history of England in one 
obscure life after another.”26 Whereas this project informs the entirety of Woolf’s oeuvre, Between 
the Acts is still a specific case: the voiceless individual that is in the centre of Woolf’s attention in 
this novel does not speak exclusively in a female voice as in some other writings; rather, the 
narrative of Between the Acts is based on the proliferation of different phenomenal and non-
phenomenal Others. The search for the unrecorded and the unheard vigorously shapes the novel: 
the inflection of the main narration by multiple outsider-insider mini narratives serves precisely 
this social and artistic purpose. The novel abounds with different small personal (hi)stories 
narratively competing for our attention – those of visitors, nurses, servants, passers by, birds, 
ghosts, even immobile objects. These minute attempts at narrative empowering open up the vista 
of unseen histories and install a polyphonic structure of rare complexity. The function of this 
polyphony is commensurate with Benjamin’s advice for the chronicler to “[narrate] events without 
distinguishing between major and minor ones” so that she “acts in accord with the following truth: 
nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost to history” (“Concept”, 390). 
Out of this overarching examination of the three aspects of time as they become visible in “the 
now of recognizability”, one distinctive vision of history emerges for Woolf of Between the Acts: 
what profiles history is the dynamics of agon and stasis. Woolf’s novel starts in Benjaminean 
fashion: the moment of danger (war) discloses the agonic nature of history for the small party 
discussing the future site for the cesspool; it impels the past to rush forth into the present, to fuse 
the scars of the Romans on the road chosen for the cesspool with those inscribed by the Second 
World War. Woolf closes Between the Acts with a comparable postulation of the agonic basis of 
history: “. . . first they must fight, as the dog fox fights with the vixen, in the heart of darkness, in 
the fields of night” (BTA, 219). The latter passage, however, reveals that antagonism is also the 
basic principle of love. In order for a new life to emerge, for a personal story to unfold into 
genealogy, one first has to struggle: “Before they slept, they must fight: after they had fought, they 
would embrace. From that embrace another life might be born” (219). Thus, for Woolf, agon 
presents itself as an overarching principle conjoining different planes of human interaction, love as 
well as hate. The idea of a parallel series of agonic histories is also an intrinsic component of 
Benjamin’s Marxist analysis of society. But it is the human perseverance in this unfolding of 
historical agons and stases that gets the most poetic and most poignant treatment in both Woolf’s 
and Benjamin’s accounts of history. Patiently stumbling, the (symbolically gendered) donkey in 
caravanserai will “go [its] way till [its] heels blister and [its] hoofs crack” (BTA, 155). Benjamin’s 
“Angel of History” would like to remain in the moment of stasis, to “awaken the dead, and make 
whole what has been smashed” (“Concept”, 392), but his flight into the future, propelled by the 
inexorable storm called ‘progress’, is as inevitable as the burdensome voyage of Woolf’s little 
donkey. The machine of history ‘chuffs’ on and the observant can only capture it at the moment of 
constellation, a content-filled or vacuous suspension of movement. Such is the practice of “true 
historians”, Benjamin relates. 
In order to circumvent the hegemony of the historical record and recover the hidden histories 
of perseverance, Benjamin’s and Woolf’s critiques partly restore to history what Benjamin claims 
to be its original role as remembrance or memoration [Eingedenken] (<Paralipomena>, 401).27 
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Wrought by the tension between activism and lamentation, this conception of history resignifies 
the notion of remembrance as not the past-made-present, but the past-that-implicates-the present.28 
This approach is premised upon the postulation of radical incompleteness for the past, a cross-
temporality which is hardly understood, let alone co-opted, by mainstream historiography. The 
methodological problems are amplified by the “modernist” requirement for this memorial practice: 
to avoid the subjugation of the past to the present, memoration has to be spontaneous. Thus a ‘true 
historian’ should articulate history through the discursive appropriation of an involuntary memory 
as it “flashes up” to the present and onward into the future “in a moment of danger”, Benjamin 
advises (“Concept”, 391). 
The narrative of Woolf’s Between the Acts centres on just such a memorative practice: Miss La 
Trobe’s pageant. As the mirror-reflection scene, the final act in Miss La Trobe’s examination of 
the “unity-disparity” of the historical subject, confirms, the pageant is a conscious artistic effort to 
(com)memorate the past as it relates to the present. Reinforcing the act of memoration as the 
dynamic principle of the historian’s work, this performative get-together moves beyond a mere 
resurrection of selected moments in past. As articulated in Miss La Trobe’s play, Woolfian history 
does not simply unfold; it interrelates. The performed historical fragments thus forge their “truth-
value” through an interrelation with other (fictional) texts: history of literature and general history 
conflate in the pageant. At the same time, this complex history-text interacts with an unlikely cast 
(villagers), their mundane occupations and their personal histories. This already complicated 
“history” is further inflected by a variety of reactions in the audience: juxtaposing the public and 
private memory, the reception (both the approval and, as the play advances, confusion felt in the 
audience) puts forward an alternative picture of the historical times under interrogation. While 
these multi-directional links constantly reconfigure the historical narrative into inconclusiveness, 
the central thrust of Woolf’s critique lies, however, elsewhere: the strategic distribution of static 
moments in the text installs an even more radical practice of “knowing history”. For, as Miss La 
Trobe intuits, memoration is least effective when it progresses smoothly and voluntarily. It is only 
when this evolutionary movement is suspended and the voluntary memory is challenged that the 
joining of the public/general and the private/individual histories succeeds in the novel. It is thus in 
shortcuts, interruptions, and (unintentional) disruptions of temporal logic – indeed, between the 
acts – that we should seek traces of the hidden dynamics of history, Woolf’s textual practice 
indicates.     
In such moments the series of agons ceases, and the agonic activity both surpasses and 
annihilates itself. In one famous intermission scene, Giles takes account of his personal failures 
and possibilities by playing a game of “mental soccer”. Arriving at the imaginary “goal”, Giles 
discovers a curled snake, choked with a toad in its mouth. Caught in the midst of movement, the 
snake and the frog have come to a stasis: “The snake was unable to swallow; the toad was unable 
to die. A spasm made the ribs contract; blood oozed. It was birth the wrong way round – a 
monstrous inversion” (BTA, 99). This “frozen image” displays in unsparing light the subject-
negating contradiction which lies at the heart of the human working in history. The self-
reproductive, hate-, love-, and birth-giving agons have led to a stasis; nothing could be gained, no 
one has won in this war-game: this is an abortive action, a “birth the wrong way round.”29 The 
potency of this image comes from the representational surprise it holds in store for the 
viewer/reader: our active, agonic history is congealed in the absurd state in which Giles finds the 
snake and the toad. It is by revealing an impasse, a stagnant gridlock, behind historical and natural 
struggles that Woolf’s moment of stasis exposes the ‘monstrosity’ of history.  
The illuminatory nature of arrested images and action-paralyses in the text affiliates Woolf’s 
use of stasis with Benjamin’s notion of the “standstill” (Stillstellung), a static instant in which the 
past and the present converge and disclose the real dialectic nature of history (“Concept”, 396). 
This is a plausible association, since Woolf emphasizes the revelatory potential of standstills in the 
narrative. In particular, Miss La Trobe’s experimentation with dramatic stasis is aimed at 
provoking such moments of revelation. In the outline of her pageant, Miss La Trobe envisions the 
strategic use of stasis: “‘After Vic., [. . .] try ten mins. of present time. Swallows, cows, etc.’ She 
wanted to expose them, as it were, to douche them, with present-time reality” (BTA, 179). This is 
an example of deliberate dramatic stasis, intended to give Miss La Trobe’s audience a chance to 
perceive themselves in history and in the present historical moment, as the narrator confirms. Such 
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experimentation should be understood as a Benjaminian-Brechtian exercise. Yet, unlike Benjamin 
(as well as Brecht), for whom the moments of stasis present a “revolutionary chance” (“Concept”, 
396), Woolf does not always conceive of them in celebratory terms. For her, the disclosure of 
historical dynamics in the moment of stasis always entails a risk. Precisely because of the intensive 
despair which accompanies such a revelation, one is prone to fall into autistic stillness, to be 
driven into ahistorical escape. The image of the snake choking with a toad in its mouth is so 
disturbing that it resides at the very verge of the representational plane. Much as it can raise 
awareness of a particular moment in history, it may also lead to meaninglessness, to the 
overwhelming feeling of absurdity that empties out our command of metaphor. The last is indeed 
Giles’s reaction to the war (BTA, 53). 
Here we may observe an important difference between Benjamin’s proposal of an active 
coalescence of the past and the present to produce the future and Woolf’s insistence that the true 
understanding of historical dynamics is granted only to “an engaged spectator”, or, better still, an 
engaged abstinent from historical dynamics. Whereas both Benjamin and Woolf relate the moment 
of stasis to an encounter with the superhistorical time of the dead (the Angel of History wants to 
“awaken the dead” (“Concept”, 392); suffering the dramatic stasis together with her audience, 
Miss La Trobe notes, “This is death, death, death” (BTA, 180)), this revelatory event implies 
different levels and types of action for the two thinkers. For Benjamin, the suprahistorical stasis is 
a moment to act historically, a moment for political revolution; for Woolf, the revelatory stasis is a 
suprahistorical moment of annihilating action, of touching death – and, together with it, the artistic 
and mythmaking essence of life. Woolf conceives of death, as Ann Banfield has astutely observed, 
as a point of separation between the (transitory) self and the (ongoing) material world, where it is 
the property of the subject, however, to try to reflect on and aesthetically describe both this 
separation and the (possible) continued life of the material world irrespective of the subject.30 This 
vision of death, I would argue, strongly influenced Woolf’s interpretation of historical 
engagement, especially in the period of writing Three Guineas and Between the Acts, at the time 
when she was trying to find an aesthetic means to render both “these rather abstract words and 
these very positive photographs – the photographs of dead bodies and ruined houses.”31 To engage 
with history from the liminal position of the subject trying to envision the world without itself 
means to perceive historical dynamics (or, more problematically perhaps, historical 
transformation) as possible without our physical presence, and yet as somehow consequential 
upon our present activity. This paradoxical vision of historical practice finds its expression in 
Woolf’s enduring belief in the paradigmatic ‘engaged abstinent’ – the artist – and his/her 
distinctive modus of “fight” – writing.  
Woolf’s redefinition of the concept of social engagement is, however, indicative of the 
complexity of the issues at hand and also of the guarded optimism of these new conceptualisations. 
For this whole “fight for the oppressed past” (“Concept”, 396), political and artistic, has an index 
to impossibility woven into the very texture of both Woolf’s and Benjamin’s projects of writing 
history. By a deliberate and almost forceful artistic move, Woolf frequently cuts short the sub-
narratives in Between the Acts – mostly through a strategic use of ellipses. Significantly, Woolf 
forever extracts parts of the peasants’ song in Miss La Trobe’s pageant, a song which narrates the 
peasants’ own ‘toil’ of history: 
 
Cutting the roads . . .  up to the hill top . . .  we climbed. Down in the valley. . . sow, wild 
boar, hog, rhinoceros, reindeer. . . Dug ourselves in to the hill top . . . Ground roots 
between stones . . . Ground corn . . . till we too . . . lay under g—r—o—u—n—d . . . (BTA,  
78) 
 
These interventions produce the effect of narrative “short-circuits” induced by an 
authorial/authoritarian power. The punctuation of gaps and omissions artistically corresponds to 
social dynamics as seen by Woolf: the universal whole of history is replete with holes. The only 
way to approach these obscured histories is, then, to cite their gaps in their irretrievability. Woolf’s 
final and most radical probing of the possibilities of writing alternative history(ies) is a sore 
celebration. 
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The need for the citability of all the obscured moments of past history presents a problem for 
Benjamin, too. In a theoretical loophole, Benjamin goes on to argue that only a “redeemed 
mankind may be granted the fullness of its past – which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind 
has its past become citable in all its moments” (“Concept”, 390). For Woolf, however, the past 
does not ostensibly “[carry] with it a secret index by which it is referred to redemption” (390); 
neither does she ostensibly entertain the theme of redemption in Between the Acts; “ostensibly”, I 
say, for the sympathetic treatment of the character of Lucy indicates that Woolf’s philosophy of 
history is also, if almost imperceptibly, interspersed by an intimate theology. One may discern this 
parallel ontological structuring of history in the sudden and often unprepared introductions of 
pantheism in the novel. It is precisely the vanishing of the peasants’ song that also affirms the 
existence of a force that surpasses even those narratively empowered: the wind, we are told, can 
make even the great names inaudible: 
 
The words died away. Only a few great names – Babylon, Nineveh, Clytemnestra, 
Agamemnon, Troy – floated across the open space. Then the wind rose, and in the rustle of 
the leaves even the great words became inaudible; and the audience sat staring at the 
villagers, whose mouths opened, but no sound came.  (BTA, 140) 
 
While this disappearance of “great names” may imply that the historical dynamics could be 
reversed, the presentation of nature as the final instance which shapes history also articulates 
Woolf’s mature pantheism, as convincingly argued by Madeline Moore.32 Nature is presented in 
the novel as a supreme power that may help as well as destroy our historical selves; at the same 
time nature is seen as abiding beyond history and ultimately uninterested in its agons and crises: 
beyond the sun withdrawing, “covering its face, as if it forbore to look on human suffering”, 
beyond the clouds of current history, lacking “symmetry and order”, far beyond earthly changes – 
“variable winds” and “rain at times”, there is – “pure blue” (BTA, 23). This unnamed 
(para)historical force is recognizable in Between the Acts as one of the natural phenomena or 
nature itself. Most frequently, however, it is simply a pattern, as argued in the contemporaneously 
written ‘A Sketch of the Past’: “From this I reach what I might call a philosophy (. . .); that behind 
the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we – I mean all human beings – are connected with this; 
that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art.”33 For Woolf, the 
redemption of history as a nightmare inheres in the constellative activity of the (artistic) human 
subject itself, irrespective of causality and the subject’s continued presence; it does so for 
Benjamin as well, but with one theological proviso: human activity is acknowledged only in the 
messianic constellation of the past and the present in which the subject is made aware that “every 
second [is] the small gateway in time through which the Messiah might enter” (“Concept”, 397).   
 
 
The Ethics of Writing History and Modernist Aesthetics      
 
The issues of pattern and historical engagement have finally led us to a hidden (and markedly 
intimate) concern informing Woolf’s and Benjamin’s reflections on history: the question of an 
ethical history-writing subject. The ideal history-writing subject, as seen by Benjamin and Woolf, 
engages with the past in such a way that he or she enacts at all times the dynamic triangulation of 
the past with the present and the future. In his <Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”>, 
Benjamin writes that “the history-writing subject is, properly, that part of humanity whose 
solidarity embraces all the oppressed” (404). Comparably to Woolf’s belief in the activity of the 
artist as engaged abstinent, Benjamin avers that such a writing-subject can “construct” a non-
reactionary universal history, the one which would rely on a structural-constructive (and thus also 
artistic) principle [Konstruktiv]. “The structural principle of universal history”, Benjamin 
proceeds, “allows [history] to be represented as partial histories”, i.e. stories (404). This is why the 
messianic idea of history (by which we should understand history as shot through and narrated via 
this structural principle) coincides with the idea of prose, Benjamin closes laconically (404). 
Whereas Benjamin’s and Woolf’s commitment to “read-write the unwritten” makes their 
respective projects akin to many contemporary and later philosophies of history, it is noteworthy 
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that, with both authors, the prospective “constructive” historiography (new prose) requires more 
than a simple alteration of the topic: it calls for a thorough revision of the operative model of 
archiving, referencing, and interpreting, and thus also a substantial modification of the current 
epistemo-critical practice. This is the reason why their performative critiques of traditional 
historiography are directed specifically against linearity as a constructive principle of 
progressivism and teleology. 
Since the historical narration is intrinsically prone to reification, to narrate history truthfully 
would mean to question the very process of narration while performing it, to invent such a mode of 
narration in which “the epic moment will always be blown apart in the process of construction” 
(<Paralipomena>, 406). Such a mode of narration would require a continuous suspension of the 
epic nature of prose. Only such prose will honour “the memory of the anonymous” (406), 
Benjamin argues. Both Benjamin’s commitment to fragmentary narration and the forceful elisions 
and fractures of the narrative in Woolf’s Between the Acts, pointedly culminating in the peasants’ 
song, perform this dedication to the memory of the anonymous. Indeed, Benjamin and Woolf 
propose remarkably similar performative responses to the question of writing history. In this 
context, some discursive similarities deserve to be noted. For instance, the syntax of both 
Benjamin’s and Woolf’s writings is characterized by the alteration of exuberance and minimalism. 
Marked by precision and subdued or overt irony, both discourses are surprisingly welded by 
redemptive, rhythmical passages with more than a hint of mysticism. This form then mimics the 
vacillation, rather than progression of the argument (or, in Woolf’s case, the novel), thereby 
invoking formally the contentual critique of the linear conception of time, history, and 
argumentation.  
On a deeper structural level, however, both Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History” and 
Woolf’s Between the Acts rely on a serial composition to exteriorise their implicit critiques of 
progressivism. While Benjamin’s text belongs to the genre of ‘theses’ (especially with respect to 
its polemic character and its gesturing towards historical importance), it also re-evaluates this 
tradition in a properly modernist manner. Benjamin’s theses takes the form of questions, 
aphorisms, and hypotheses, a form which, one may argue, resembles that of Kafka’s aphoristic-
philosophical miniatures. The linearity of this textual series is challenged in two ways: by breaking 
the narrative into images-fragments and by the montage-like constellation of these fragments, a 
technique which involves repetition, inversion, and convolution. These strategies exteriorise what 
the text contains: a critique of the concept of linear progression. For “history”, Benjamin claims, 
“breaks down into images not into stories” (‘N’, p. 67-8). This performance corresponds to a 
compact set of definitions of what (‘Benjaminian’) historical materialism might be, offered in 
Convolute 11 of the Arcades Project: 
 
Re the basic doctrine of historical materialism: 1) A historical object is whatever is 
redeemed by knowledge. 2) History breaks down into images, not into stories. 3) Wherever 
a dialectical process takes place, we are dealing with a monad. 4) The materialist 
presentation of history goes hand in hand with an immanent critique of the concept of 
progress. 5) The procedures of historical materialism are founded on experience, on 
common sense, on presence of mind, and on dialectics. (‘N’, 67-8)  
 
These postulates suggest that Benjamin understands history as a modernist narrative event – a 
fragmentary juxtaposition of images rather than a seamless progression of stories. Since the 
discourse on history should mime the discourse of history, Benjamin proposes a history-writing 
practice that deals away with the concept of progress/progression: a dialectical reflection that 
singles out a historical event as a ‘monad’ rather than just a passing incident in the succession of 
historical changes. In this monad, a moment in the past and a moment in the present coalesce 
explosively, subverting the continuum of history and providing the historian with a theoretical and 
practical model for altering the present. And this is where Benjamin’s text discloses its close 
structural correspondence to Woolf’s last artistic cogitations on history. 
In the context of Woolf’s entire oeuvre, Between the Acts may strike one at first as a case of 
comparatively traditional (i.e., linear) story-telling. Yet a closer look reveals that, behind the 
appearance of a conventional narrative, the novel is replete with modal interlacing, subtle 
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linguistic experimentation, and instances of generic hybridity. These poetic aberrations are 
grouped into sections (thirty-seven of them). Each section begins with a memorably delineated 
image (the parlour with the windows open to the garden and summer’s night (Section 1; BTA, 3), 
nurses trundling the perambulator up and down the terrace (Section 2; 10), and on) which then 
unfolds and extends – temporally, but also cross- and extra-temporally.34 The opening section, the 
summer night scene in the Oliver household, is exemplary of this dynamics. The introductory 
image of a “big room with the windows open to the garden” at night (3) inaugurates a 
simultaneously historically specific and extra-temporal (and intertextual) chronotope that will 
memorably cast its shadow not only on this section but also on the entirety of the novel. This 
image-setting mentally extends into a specific site, chosen for the cesspool. The latter image is 
explicitly cast as a Benjaminian monad conjoining (involuntarily) the past and the present: “From 
an aeroplane, [Bart] said, you could still see, plainly marked, the scars made by the Britons; by the 
Romans, by the Elizabethan manor house; and by the plough” (4). Woolf invokes the scars from 
the Romans in order to indicate the present scars, those that the Second World War has inscribed; 
the latter are specified almost immediately by the introduction of Woolf’s favoured marker of 
crisis/war in this novel – the image of the aeroplane.35 In this way, each section in Between the 
Acts acquires the status of an extended ‘monadic’ image, an aspect (trait) of which is subtly 
reinforced in the following or later episode. Thus each image-section interacts, peacefully or 
conflictingly, with other such images. The process takes different forms: repetition (e.g., the 
phrase “The laughter died away” which begins sections 14 and 15 (BTA, 58; 65)), inversion (Isa’s 
‘outer’ and ‘inner’ love in sections 3 and 4), contraposition/shifting of perspectives (Lucy’s 
looking out of the window onto the garden in Section 2 is developed in reverse as a view from the 
garden in Section 3), convolution (the motif of the fish in sections 7 and 8), and others. 
The effects of this compositional strategy are reinforced by a complex play of displaced and 
proper analogies and, as we have seen, Woolf’s attempts narratively to perform the dynamics of 
agon and stasis. These narrative strategies indicate a comparable view of history as an 
agglomeration of images rather than a long and winding story, a vision of history that Woolf might 
have acquired only in the last years of her life.36 Between the Acts thus presents an extraordinary, 
perfectly timed (if never actually read at the time of its production) contribution to Benjamin’s 
impossible project – at once to narrate and to question the narration of history.  
This structural and thematic comparison and the recognition of Benjamin and Woolf’s shared 
endorsement of “constructive principle” in history-writing/reading opens many other rewarding 
enquiries regarding the philosophy of history in the 1920s and the 1930s. At the same time, both 
Woolf and Benjamin gain something from this discursive juxtaposition: Woolf’s mature aesthetic 
politics is placed where it should rightfully abide – in the realm of philosophy of history – and 
Benjamin’s cogitations on history become actualized in aesthetic performance. Each serves as a 
corrective of the other, too: Woolf’s gendering of philosophy of history productively reframes 
Benjamin’s propositions; Benjamin’s philosophical resuscitation of material history from and 
through the mythmaking activity reorients Woolf’s own engagement with material history, super-
history, and the ways in which they are rendered. In effect, Benjamin helps us evaluate Woolf’s 
epistemology and philosophy of history, as expounded in her essayistic prose and fiction in the late 
1930s, and the understanding of Woolf’s art becomes invaluable for our assessment of the position 
of aesthetic production in Benjamin’s thought on history. 
Finally, if the (re)articulation of history through narration is the primary potential of an ethical 
historical subject, then my project of interrelating Benjamin’s and Woolf’s philosophies of history 
– a mission that has only begun – should be understood as a performance in history, too. By 
invoking a constellation that has escaped the record and registering its contents as well as its 
lacunae, one enters the action-field of history.    
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